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SUING THE PRESS: LIBEL, THE MEDIA, AND POWER By Rodney A.
Smolla. New York: Oxford University Press. 1986. Pp. viii, 277.
$18.95.

Legal systems reflect the cultures which conceived them. Developments in the law theoretically follow changes in societal standards,
with certain basic beliefs serving as a foundation for the entire system.
Suing the Press: Libel, the Media, & Power, by Rodney A. Smolla, 1
attempts to show specifically how the law of libel has changed in the
last twenty years in conjunction with American culture. Smolla, by
examining several noted libel cases from the last two decades, shows
how cultural changes affect jurors' attitudes toward the law of libel.
He explains what these views are and how they developed from society's view of the media, and he concludes by offering suggestions for
reform in the law.
Smolla contends that most states' present libel laws are not consistent with "[the] natural human habits of mind," and that as juries
overreact to libel suits, their decisions are "far out of line . . . from
either the formal rules of libel law or the conventions of modern journalism" (p. 189). Smolla also claims that the explosion of libel suits
since New York Times v. Sullivan 2 was decided in 1964, "supposedly a
great liberating press victory" (p. 25), is largely a result of the way
Americans currently view themselves, the media, and the relationship
between the two. These theories, posited in the initial chapter, serve as
the foundation for the remainder of the book and provide the most
valuable insights that Smolla has to offer.
One explanation which Smolla offers for the increase in libel litigation is that Americans today simply do not trust the press. He cites a
recent Harris survey which indicated that only 20% of those polled
had a great deal of confidence in the media (p. 9). He suggests that
mistrust and suspicion of the media are fueled by incidents such as the
scandalous revelation that the Pulitzer Prize-winning Washington Post
stories by Janet Cooke about an eight-year-old heroin addict were
fabricated (p. 9). In addition, Smolla argues that in the past Americans did not view the news with the reverence that they do today because they recognized that newspapers, and the news that they
reported, were an extension of their publishers' personalities and ideologies. In the past, people expected some bias and evaluated those
news accounts accordingly. Today, however, reporters - especially
television news anchors - are often held in high esteem and are
I. J.D., Duke University School of Law. Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville.
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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viewed as purveyors of "the Truth." Someone like Walter Cronkite,
for example, holds a sanctified position in the minds of many. This
glorified view of the media, Smolla contends, is partly responsible for
the increase in libel litigation. Juries which have been very unsympathetic to media defendants "may be reflecting a general public backlash against that oracular role" (p. 11 ).
A suit brought by William P. Tavoulareas, the president and chief
executive officer of Mobil Oil Corporation, against the Washington
Post is an example of this phenomenon. 3 A front-page story in the
November 30, 1979, edition of the Post reported that Tavoulareas had
used his influence to set up his son, Peter, in a newly formed shipping
business which had business dealings with Mobil. The obvious implication of the story was that there was some impropriety in this arrangement. During the course of the trial it became apparent that no
such impropriety had existed; Tavoulareas had revealed all of these
activities to the board of directors, and had excused himself from the
decision-making process in matters concerning his son. Libel law, as
articulated in Sullivan, allowed a recovery by Tavoulareas only if the
Post had acted recklessly with regard to the truth of the story. The
jury, however, seemingly ignored this standard, and awarded damages
based on the fact that the tenor of the article suggested something
which was untruthful. In effect, the jury held the Post strictly liable
for the truthfulness of its story. Smolla suggests that this reflects the
jury's backlash against the exalted position the media seems to have
assumed in today's society. The danger in this, according to Smolla, is
the possibility that the media may be forced to decrease its investigative reporting.
Another reason Smolla suggests for the explosion in libel litigation
is the "general increase in the sensitivity of the media's victims" (p.
15). Smolla labels this phenomenon "the general thinning of the
American skin" (p. 16). Americans today feel a profound need to protect their self-image, and libel suits have become the prevalent remedial device used when a newspaper article or television broadcast
somehow injures that self-image. "As Americans spend more and
more of the gross national product on narcissistic self improvement, as
increasing effort and expense is spent on first finding and then nurturing the inner self, one might expect greater umbrage to be taken when
that self is damaged" (p. 19). This motivation for filing a libel suit
becomes even clearer when such noted plaintiffs as William Westmoreland and Carol Burnett make public their intentions to donate
any damage awards to charity. The desire for a good public image,
rather than an economic damages award, is their primary reason for
seeking retribution through the courts.
3. 567 F. Supp. 651 (D.D.C. 1983) (entering judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor
of the Post), ajfd. on rehearing, 817 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane).
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This cultural phenomenon affects aspects of media law other than
libel law as well. Smolla presents the Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis suit
against Christian Dior as an example of a case motivated by the desire
to preserve one's image for oneself.4 Dior used an actress named Barbara Reynolds, who looked remarkably similar to Onassis, in one of its
advertisements. Onassis obtained a court order banning any further
publications of the ad based on the theory that it used her image for
the purposes of trade without first obtaining her consent. Even though
the person in the ad was not actually Onassis, the court granted the
order, reasoning that the law must prevent the appropriation of a public person's essence through the unauthorized use of that person's visual image. Smolla points out that the court reached this decision
despite evidence that an examination of the ad made it clear that it was
not Onassis in the picture, and that her endorsement of the product
was not the subject of the advertisement. Smolla argues that this expansion of the concept of a protected self-image was fueled by shifts in
American culture from the sixties to the eighties. He sees "the thinning of the American skin" as a major factor in the increase in libel
suits. 5
The size of the awards that juries are willing to give successful
plaintiffs in libel actions reflects yet another way the law of libel has
changed along with American culture. Many find it particularly disturbing that the amount of these awards bears no apparent relation to
the amount of harm incurred. Smolla cites Carol Burnett's suit
against the National Enquirer as an indication of this. 6 The National
Enquirer published an article which accused Carol Burnett of being in
a drunken state in a Washington, D.C. restaurant and engaging in an
argument with Henry Kissinger while there. These groundless allegations undoubtedly caused some personal distress to Burnett. In the
case, however, there was no evidence which indicated that she lost
work because of the article, or that she suffered any permanent physical or psychological damage because of it. In fact, as Smolla points
out, the article may have actually enhanced her reputation because her
crusade against the magazine made her a heroine among her peers.
The jury, however, awarded Burnett $1.6 million in damages. Smolla
concludes that "juries are simply becoming more openly supportive of
compensating injuries to the psyche, and judges are becoming more
willing to let juries do so" (p. 25). Smolla points out that this generos4. Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 122 Misc. 2d 603, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1984), ajfd., 110 A.D.2d 1095, 488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
5. P. 16. Courts have even protected the self-image of people who have died. For example,
Elvis Presley impersonators have been prevented from performing because their acts commercially exploit the likeness of Presley. Pp. 124-27.
6. Burnett v. National Enquirer, 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1983), appeal
dismissed, 465 U.S. 1014 (1984).
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ity of juries leads to even more libel suits since plaintiffs are attracted
by potentially large damage awards.
Smolla concludes with some ideas for reforming the law of libel.
However, none of these suggestions are entirely original, 7 and some
actually contradict points made earlier in the book. For example,
Smolla proposes that the losing side in a libel case pay the attorneys'
fees of the winning side. This supposedly would deter plaintiffs from
bringing dubious claims and may serve to deter those plaintiffs who
are motivated by money alone. Earlier in the book, however, Smolla
pointed out that many plaintiffs are not motivated by money, but by a
sincere desire to protect their self-image. If this is true, the payment of
attorneys' fees would not effectively deter these plaintiffs. Furthermore, when the media lost it would be forced to pay the plaintiff's
legal fees on top of any damage award, and this would further chill
speech.
The bulk of Suing the Press consists of Smolla's accounts of actual
libel cases, including their circumstances and decisions. These descriptions add nothing significant that could not be gleaned by reading
the trial transcripts and appellate decisions themselves. There are
some unique thoughts offered by Smolla, such as the idea that the National Enquirer in effect condemned Carol Burnett's reputation and
paid its fair market value in accordance with the law of eminent domain. The subject matter also affords Smolla the opportunity to comment on such diverse topics as pornography, Vietnam, the Middle
East, and Elvis Presley imitators. For the most part, however, the
accounts are simply more readable versions of the cases themselves.
The value of the book lies in its discussion of how the law conforms to cultural standards. The role that juries play in conforming
the law to those standards is the thread which runs throughout the
book and helps to tie together the disparate chapters. The book may
have been more valuable had this theme been applied to areas of the
law other than media law. This underlying foundation, however, does
provide a focus to the book, and makes Suing the Press a thoughtprovoking work.
-

Michael L. Chidester

7. See Van Alstyne, First Amendment Limitations on Recovery From the Press-A11 Extended
Comment on the "Anderson Solution," 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 793 (1984); Taylor, Cost of
Libel Suits Prompts Calls to Alter System, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1985, at Al 1, col. 1.

